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STRANGERS ON A TRAIN 
Pierre N. Leval* 
MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT. By Anthony Lewis. New York: Random House. 1991. Pp. 
xii, 354. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $13.00. 
A book reviewed two years after its publication had best be impor-
tant, and lastingly so. Anthony Lewis's1 Make No Law2 easily quali-
fies. The book's importance derives in part from the immense (and 
easily undervalued) importance of its subject - the Supreme Court's 
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 3 
This fascinating study reveals how Justice Brennan, the author of 
the Supreme Court's opinion, in his perspicacity, boldness, and states-
manship, rescued the nation from not one but two insidious dangers. 
In so doing, Brennan earned his place in a tiny group - Madison, 
Jefferson, Hand, Holmes, Brandeis, Black-who, understanding how 
essential to a free society is a free marketplace for discussion, rescued 
freedom of speech from xenophobic hysteria. 
Mr. Lewis is an ideal narrator of this morality play, for he is a 
journalist, historian, and legal scholar, as well as a lucid and exciting 
writer. This book harnesses all these powers. For Lewis, a story is not 
a single narrative line with a beginning and an end, but a confluence of 
innumerable rivers of history that stretch endlessly into the past and 
the future. The story of Justice Brennan's great, liberating opinion is 
inseparable from the history of slavery and the South's refusal to lose 
the Civil War for one hundred years after Appomattox- inseparable 
from the embattled concept of free speech going back through swerv-
ing changes to Madison and Jefferson, to Mill, Blackstone, Milton, 
and Henry VIII. 
What we might call "Book One" is the story of slavery, the "pecu-
liar institution" of the old South, the cornerstone of its economic sys-
tem, euphemistically sanctioned in the original text of the 
Constitution; it is the story of the Civil War, which brought the issue 
of slavery to the fore, and of the next hundred years of defiant south-
ern adherence to institutions designed to perpetuate the subjugation of 
the black race, a struggle to which the defeated proslavery forces of 
the South were far more deeply committed than their northern opposi-
" Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. -Ed. 
1. Anthony Lewis is a columnist for The New York Times. 
2. [hereinafter cited by page number only]. 
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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tion. The Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 forbade slavery; the South 
responded with Black Codes that accomplished a subjugation almost 
as invidious as slavery. To the first Civil Rights Acts4 (providing for 
the right to contract and hold property) and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the South responded with Jim Crow laws segregating all public 
facilities, which received constitutional approval from the Supreme 
Court in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson. 5 For another half century little 
changed. Any attempts at civil rights legislation were stymied by 
southern senators's artful manipulation, often by filibuster, of the rules 
of congressional procedure. Finally, in 1954 the Supreme Court de-
cided Brown v. Board of Education, 6 and an effective, broad-based civil 
rights movement came alive. There followed Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and his movement of nonviolent resistance, Rosa Parks and the 
success of the Montgomery bus boycott, and in 1957 the first Civil 
Rights Act since 1875. The response was White Citizens Councils and 
violent assaults on Freedom Riders of the civil rights movement, as 
well as on blacks exercising their newly accorded rights. Northern 
journalists, including Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times, re-
ported on this violence. Civil rights groups placed ads in the northern 
press calling attention to the violence and soliciting support for their 
cause. This history sets Lewis's stage for New York Times v. Sullivan. 
"Book Two" is a chilling, detailed account of the South's adoption, 
particularly in Alabama, of an ingenious, devastating counteroffensive 
weapon against the civil rights movement. The weapon was the libel 
action, brought before biased judges and juries (all white), designed to 
silence and punish the press. Numerous officials of local government 
sued for libel in the courts of Alabama, seeking many millions in ag-
gregate damages against the New York Times. The first suits were 
aimed at Salisbury's news accounts and at an ad placed by a Commit-
tee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in 
the South. The ad sought contributions, calling attention to the vio-
lent repression of the peaceful demonstrations protesting segregation. 
One of the suits was brought by L. B. Sullivan, a city commissioner of 
Montgomery, who was not mentioned, even obliquely, in the ad, but 
who claimed that the ad's mention of the Montgomery police, for 
which he was responsible, libelled him. The ad was found to contain a 
few innocuous mistakes of fact. For example, Dr. King had been ar-
rested four times, not seven; armed police did not "ring" the campus 
where black students were seeking admission as the ad alleged, but 
were deployed nearby; protesting black students had sung the "Na-
tional Anthem,'' not "My Country 'Tis of Thee"; and students had 
4. Civil Rights Acts of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; 1871, ch. 99, 16 
Stat. 433 and ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337. 
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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been expelled not for demonstrating at the Capitol, but for demanding 
service at a lunch counter in the County Courthouse. 
Lewis recounts a frightening tale of abuse of judicial power in the 
Alabama trial court (pp. 23-25): every ruling was made against the 
defendants, regardless of precedent, regardless even of the judge's own 
contrary assertions in his treatise on Alabama procedure; the judge 
ruled the statements libelous per se; the issue of falsity was taken from 
the jury because the Times had admitted the inaccuracy of certain rel-
atively innocuous details; damage to Sullivan's reputation was pre-
sumed. The jury then dutifully awarded the full $500,000 demand, 
and the Supreme Court of Alabama unceremoniously affirmed. By the 
time Sullivan's action reached the Supreme Court, another Montgom-
ery official's suit had also produced a $500,000 judgment. Eleven 
more actions were pending (pp. 35, 151). If such judgments could 
stand, it would not take long for the Alabama courts to put the New 
York Times either out of business altogether, or out of the business of 
reporting on the violent southern resistance to the lawful integration 
of the schools and public facilities. 
Lewis's third history turns to explore the development of the con-
cept of a free press (pp. 46-102). This notion, as we understand it 
today, managed only recently, and just barely, to establish itself on a 
small part of the earth's surface, thanks largely to a few visionaries. 
The invention of the printing press was very soon followed by the 
institution of royal licensing in England. Although introduced in the 
guise of a revenue raising excise, the impetus for licensing derived 
more probably from the desire to exercise royal control over a poten-
tially destabilizing instrument. The printing press was a menace be-
cause it facilitated the dissemination of dangerous ideas. 
In England, even the most vociferous opponents of censorship had 
no quarrel with the infliction of severe subsequent punishment for in-
appropriate publications. Milton, for example, whose Areopagitica 
had thundered against licensing of the printed word, believed that for 
works "found [to be] mischievous and libelous, the fire and the execu-
tioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall remedy .... "7 
And long after Britain did away with censorship, it continued to 
punish the crime of seditious libel - the publication of statements 
about government officials that would tend to expose them to public 
disrespect. Stability of government was deemed the most highly 
prized value. Seditious libels might threaten that stability and thus 
required severe punishment. Truth was no defense. Indeed, when the 
libel was true, it was all the more dangerous. 
The notion of a free press that developed in England was of a press 
that was largely free from previous restraint, but not free from punish-
7. P. 52 (citing 4 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Print-
ing, in THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 293, 353 (Columbia Univ. Press 1931) (1644)). 
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ment for inappropriate publications. According to Blackstone, "to 
punish ... any dangerous or offensive writings ... [because of their] 
pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and 
good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of 
civil liberty."8 
It is startling how close these notions came to taking root on 
American soil. War and turmoil are never a healthy climate for free-
dom of speech. In 1798 John Adams was President of the new democ-
racy. His Federalist party controlled both houses of Congress. 
Roiling with suspicion and fear of France's new populist government, 
which was lopping off heads with abandon and had attacked Ameri-
can merchant ships carrying cargo to England, the Federalists identi-
fied the opposition party of Vice President Jefferson and of Madison as 
dangerous French sympathizers "sowing the seeds of vice, irreligion, 
corruption and sedition" (p. 57). 
Fresh from the establishment of the Bill of Rights, with its guaran-
tee that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of 
the press,"9 the Federalist Congress passed its own Sedition Act of 
1798, making it a crime punishable by up to two years imprisonment 
and a fine of up to $2000 (real money in those days) to "publish ... 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing . . . against the govern-
ment ... , either house of the Congress ... or the President ... with 
intent to defame ... or to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute 
... or to excite against them ... the hatred of the good people of the 
United States."10 It was against the party of Madison and Jefferson 
that the Sedition Act was aimed - as made unmistakably clear by the 
fact that, while protecting the President and the Congress, it carefully 
omitted the Vice President (Jefferson) from the scope of its protection. 
There was no penalty for exciting the hatred of the good people of the 
United States against him. Happily, the Sedition Act had a wonderful 
feature that today's Congress should be encouraged to employ: it car-
ried a sunset provision; designed to protect the Federalist government 
during President Adams's term, the Act expired on the day his term 
ended. 11 Its Federalist proponents believed the Act passed constitu-
tional muster by reason of the Blackstonian British view that freedom 
of the press meant no more than freedom from prior restraint, and 
that the power to punish seditious writings was necessary to preserve 
peace, order, and a stable government. (One of the Act's most elo-
quent supporters was the Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall.) 
The case against the Sedition Act was championed by Jefferson 
and Madison, acting largely in secret to avoid prosecution. Madison 
8. P. 54 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
10. P. 58 (citing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)). 
11. Pp. 58, 65 (citing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)). 
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drafted the Virginia Resolutions, which proclaimed "the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication 
among the people thereon" as "the only effectual guardian of every 
other right." 12 Madison reasoned that the British precedents had no 
application here because of the different foundations of government. 
In Britain, the legitimacy of government derived from the sovereign. 
In the United States, it was the people who bestowed legitimacy on the 
government. Because the people were the source of all power, their 
right to free discussion of public matters was paramount. 
By authority of the Sedition Act, numerous opponents of the Fed-
eralist government were prosecuted, jailed, and fined. The defendants 
included editors and publishers of newspapers, pamphleteers, and a 
Congressman who wrote a letter to the editor. By reason of the Act's 
expiration, and Jefferson's succession to the Presidency, it was never 
reviewed in the Supreme Court. Jefferson promptly pardoned those 
convicted, stating "that law to be a nullity, as absolute and palpable as 
if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image" 
(p. 65). 
The Blackstonian view was not dead, however. It recovered 
strength in this century. Ironically, it was Holmes, later to be a great 
champion of press freedom, who found no problem in Patterson v. Col-
orado 13 affirming the contempt conviction of an editor who had criti-
cized a judge. The First Amendment guaranteed freedom from prior 
restraints but did not bar punishment of publications contrary to the 
public welfare. · 
Madison had proclaimed it a "universal truth that the loss of lib-
erty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or 
pretended, from abroad." 14 The accuracy of his observation was reaf-
firmed at the outbreak of World War I when Congress passed a so-
called Espionage Act, which made it a crime to "attempt to cause ... 
disloyalty ... or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the 
United States" or to "attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment 
service."15 
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court, through Holmes, affirmed a 
conviction under the Espionage Act. 16 Although pulling back from 
his view in Patterson that freedom meant nothing more than immunity 
from prior restraint, Holmes affirmed that in wartime circumstances 
Congress might punish speech that incited "a clear and present danger 
12. P. 61 (citing JAMES MADISON, THE VA. RESOLUTIONS (1798), reprinted in THE WRIT· 
INGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 328-29 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam 1906)). 
13. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
14. P. 56 (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), in THE 
COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS, at 257-58 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953)). 
15. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, as amended by Act of May 16, 
1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, 553. 
16. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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[of] substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."17 Holmes 
had even less difficulty affirming the conviction of Eugene Debs for a 
socialist speech suggesting that men who had been convicted of abet-
ting draft obstruction were "paying the penalty for standing erect and 
for seeking to pave the way to better conditions for all mankind."18 
Into this turmoil enters a great and unrecognized hero of press 
freedom's struggle to be born - a district judge, Learned Hand, who 
enjoined the postmaster from barring circulation of an antiwar maga-
zine.19 Hand based his decision on the "right to criticise either by 
temperate reasoning, or by immoderate and indecent invective, which 
is normally the privilege of the individual in countries dependent upon 
the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority."20 
Hand thus interpreted the prohibition of the Espionage Act to reach 
only "direct incitement to violent resistance" (p. 70). Hand's identifi-
cation of "free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of author-
ity" in our form of government was visionary - and slow to gain 
acceptance. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.21 
Hand's opinion itself was largely forgotten for decades. Nonethe-
less, Hand's influence soon grew significant because of a happenstance, 
an almost magical event of fable simplicity, and of inestimable impor-
tance for our republic - the chance meeting of Holmes and Hand on 
a train, one of those amazing events, too beautiful and unreal for the 
movies, that now and then take place in the real world. In those days 
travel was slow and afforded opportunities for leisurely conversation. 
Hand, the young district judge, discreetly sketched his notions of free 
speech's necessary role in a democratic state. After the train ride, the 
two jurists corresponded. In these exchanges (unearthed by Gerald 
Gunther, Hand's biographer),22 Hand gently moved an initially un-
receptive Holmes ("I'm afraid I don't quite get your point.")23 toward 
the view that opinions on public matters need to be well tested and 
scrutinized, that this cannot happen unless they may be uttered freely, 
and that speech should be punishable only when "directly an incite-
ment" to illegality, and not based on a mere "tendency" to a bad 
result. 
Hand's influence percolated into Holmes's consciousness. The 
next test before the Supreme Court in Abrams v. United States 24 re-
17. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
18. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213 (1919). 
19. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y 1917), revd., 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
20. 244 F. at 539. 
21. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917). 
22. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 732-44 (1975). 
23. P. 75 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand, Apr. 3, 1919, re-
printed in Gunther, supra note 22, at 759-60). 
24. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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sulted from convictions under even more repressive amendments to 
the Espionage Act, which made it a crime to print "disloyal ... scurri-
lous or abusive language" about the Constitution, the military, or the 
flag.25 The Supreme Court easily affirmed the convictions for distrib-
uting procommunist leaflets urging workers to "[w]ake up" and save 
"Russia's emancipation" from "his Majesty, Mr. Wilson, and the rest 
of his gang; dogs of all colors."26 This time, however, Holmes dis-
sented, joined by Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Although Holmes pro-
fessed to stand by his earlier opinions, the new dissent spoke in a 
dramatically different voice. Where the "clear and present danger" 
formula had earlier justified punishment, it was now summoned -
fortified with additional, more protective adjectives and adverbs - to 
create a wide zone of immunity for objectionable opinions. Holmes's 
dissenting opinion, permeated by thoughts Hand had planted, is a 
magnificent declaration of the principles that are now acknowledged 
to underlie the First Amendment. 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . . That 
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all 
life is an experiment . . . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and 
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten im-
mediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required to save the country.27 
Through the next decade, in Gitlow, Whitney and Schwimmer, 28 the 
great dissenters Holmes and Brandeis "persuaded the country and, in 
time, the Court. "29 
What often matters most in determining the content of the rules is 
who makes them. Thus, it was perhaps predictable that the most tena-
cious of restrictive limitations on press freedom were the judge-made 
rules that imposed contempt for public commentary on pending litiga-
tion - a rule which remains in full force in Britain and in Canada. 
Judges dislike press commentary on cases in progress, especially jury 
25. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, as amended by Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 
75, 40 Stat. 553. 
26. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 620. 
27. 250 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added). 
28. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 {1925) (Holmes, J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J. & Holmes, J., concurring); United 
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
29. P. 89. Their Whitney opinion was technically a concurrence because procedural default 
prevented the defendant from relying in the Supreme Court on constitutional issues she had not 
raised below. In spirit, however, it dissented powerfully from the state's power to prosecute for 
criminal syndicalism. "It is the function of speech," Brandeis wrote, "to free men from the 
bondage of irrational fears." 274 U.S. at 376. 
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cases, because the commentary can influence the result, or even abort 
the proceeding. In the United States, the rule forbidding such com-
mentary was dispatched in 1941 in Bridges v. California 30 thanks to 
the visionary perseverance of Justice Hugo Black, and the persuasive 
power of his draft dissenting opinion, which became the opinion of the 
Court when it persuaded a wavering member of the initial majority to 
change sides and eventually captured a new Justice appointed since 
the initial hearing. Lewis powerfully exploits the irony of how frail 
and accidental are many of the threads from which history is woven 
- how close it all came to turning out otherwise. Black, now writing 
for the majority and, in the interest of statesmanship and victory, com-
promising his far more absolute views of freedom of speech, restated 
Holmes's chameleon's test, ever more heavily clad with the protective 
armor of adverbs and adjectives: "What finally emerges from the 
'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the sub-
stantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence 
extremely high before utterances can be punished."31 
Now Mr. Lewis's peripatetic adventure returns to Montgomery, 
Commissioner Sullivan, and the New York Times, as their case ad-
vances to the Supreme Court. How could a libel case reach the 
Supreme Court? Libel was governed by state tort law; it lay outside 
the protection of the First Amendment (false calumny having no claim 
on freedom of speech) and, therefore, outside the scope of the Supreme 
Court's power. Yet, what could be more clear, certainly in hindsight, 
than that Alabama's devastating libel verdicts would succeed in estab-
lishing censorship and destroying freedom of the press? As Madison, 
Jefferson, and Hand had instinctively perceived, and Holmes had more 
gradually learned, subsequent punishments, if sufficiently grave, are 
effective prior restraints. 
The New York Times, threatened with extinction, drafted into its 
service Herbert Wechsler, one of the nation's most powerful, 
respected, and uncompromising scholars of constitutional law, to seek 
review by the Supreme Court. 
Among the most challenging tasks faced by an appellate litigator, 
especially in the Supreme Court, is judging how high to aim. If the 
human race were rational, a contention of law would have the same 
persuasive force whether it is listed first or third. But life doesn't work 
that way. If the first argument offends or alienates any of the Justices, 
the logical force of the third approach may be lost. On the other hand, 
if the third argument can win only a portion of what is at stake, can 
the litigator afford to forego the more ambitious contentions? There 
are no easy answers. 
Wechsler, and his assistant Marvin Frankel, then a teacher at the 
30. 314 U.S. 252. 
31. 314 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added). 
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Columbia Law School and later a federal judge, developed, juggled, 
and presented several arguments that varied greatly in the size of the 
prize they offered (pp. 107-09, 113-22). The most ambitious was the 
contention, building on the thinking of Jefferson and Madison, that 
the ability to criticize government was essential to a free society; that 
the Alabama damage award in favor of an officer of government effec-
tively reinstated the concept of seditious libel, anathema to the First 
Amendment; and hence, that no such cause of action should be per-
mitted. It was a bold argument, based on simple concepts, capable of 
winning the press immunity from suit for criticism of a public official. 
It was likely to appeal to Justice Black and maybe others, but likely 
also to offend Justices who were more cautious. Such an argument 
might be seen to ignore valid concerns of federalism and, furthermore, 
to render all those in government service defenseless against press 
excesses. 
A more complicated position, offering a more circumscribed vic-
tory, was based on an obscure precedent from Kansas;32 it argued that 
libel of a public official was not actionable unless intentionally false, or 
reckless in the face of likely falsity. The First Amendment protects 
good faith criticism of government, even when it falls into error, but 
not deliberate or wanton falsehood. 
Still more circumspect was the argument that Commissioner Sulli-
van's judgment could not stand because the criticisms in the Times ad 
were not about him: the First Amendment demands, at least, that 
libel judgments not be awarded in favor of persons who were not ob-
jects of the criticism. Such an argument might win this case, but 
would offer no protection for cases where a government official was 
actually criticized. This position would therefore do little to protect 
the Times from punishments administered by the southern courts for 
its news reporting (pp. 120-21). 
Finally, there was the argument that the Times's sale of a few cop-
ies and employment of a stringer in Alabama did not subject it to suit 
in Alabama. Because the libel law was traditionally thought to fall 
outside the scope of the First Amendment, some considered this the 
only argument with a chance of winning (p. 122). 
When a litigator actually appears before a court to argue, he loses 
control to some extent of his strategies. Wechsler had been deter-
mined to stress the more conservative, less threatening arguments. 
But Justice Black, intrigued by the bold contention of absolute free-
dom of the press to criticize government, persistently questioned him 
on this theory, endangering Wechsler's ability to present the more 
conservative arguments. Wechsler was relatively confident of Black's 
32. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723 (1908). 
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vote and thus did not need to woo him. But Black's questioning pre-
vented him from wooing the Justices he needed to worry about. 
Once it had agreed to review the Alabama decision, the Supreme 
Court faced a case which, like many on its docket, involved a clash 
between fundamental government policies. At stake on the one hand 
was the ability of the press to discharge its most important duties in a 
democracy: to report and comment on the actions of government. On 
the other lay the sanctity of the federalist principle that the states and 
their judicial systems should adjudicate disputes arising under their 
law without interference from Washington. Also involved were prin-
ciples of stability and democratic responsibility, principles that disfa-
vor the creation of new law by courts whose judges hold life tenure 
without responsibility to any electorate. 
Other questions of momentous importance lurked slightly below 
the surface. Would the adoption of a rule that immunized the press 
from responsibility for defamation create a monster? Would an affirm-
ance of a state's power to eviscerate the press through libel judgments 
doom the success of the civil rights movement? If the reactionary 
forces of segregation could intimidate, beat, or even murder civil rights 
volunteers and citizens who claimed their lawful entitlements, without 
the ability of the press to report on the events, would the movement 
die? 
Justice Brennan's opinion strikes a careful and interesting balance. 
It protects the essential functions of the press from intimidation by the 
threat of money damage awards, so long as the defamatory material 
was published in good faith. There is no absolute immunity. No pro-
tection is given to false defamatory publications that are shown by 
clear and convincing evidence to be intentionally false or published in 
reckless disregard of their probable falsity. The opinion recognizes, 
however, that a biased jury under the supervision of a biased judge can 
and will return a biased verdict regardless of the standard explained in 
the instructions. Thus, the opinion gives the appellate courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, the duty to examine the evidence of inten-
tional falsity or reckless disregard to make sure that it complies with 
the exacting standard of proof mandated by the First Amendment. 
The Court was thus able to protect the Times, and the press generally, 
from a succession of crushing money judgments that would have been 
awarded regardless of the standards prescribed in the jury instruc-
tions. This was a great, visionary, and artful decision. Professor Alex-
ander Meiklejohn, a leading spokesman for freedom of the press, 
described it as "an occasion for dancing in the streets" (p. 154). 
The outcome in the Supreme Court was not a foregone conclusion. 
One of the most fascinating passages of Lewis's book is its rare explo-
ration of the negotiating process that occurred offstage in the Supreme 
Court. These unusual glimpses of private communications between 
1148 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1138 
Justices became available to the author for two reasons. First, Justice 
Brennan's papers have been deposited with the manuscript section of 
the Library of Congress. Second, it was Brennan's habit to assign a 
clerk to memorialize the negotiating history of every opinion he wrote; 
Steven R. Barnett, now a law professor at Berkeley, recorded the fasci-
nating evolution of the Sullivan opinion, which reflects the personali-
ties of the major participants. The process reveals Brennan's clarity of 
thought, his perceptive recognition of how very high were the stakes, 
his statesmanship, and his patient inclination to persuade by reason 
rather than by invective or result-oriented labeling. 
From the Justices's first conference there was no doubt that the 
Alabama judgment would be vacated. All nine Justices agreed to this 
result, but generally on a narrow ground - insufficient reference in 
the advertisement to the plaintiff - that would have done nothing to 
deal with the larger problems posed by the case. 
Chief Justice Warren's assignment of Brennan to write the opinion 
of the Court perhaps resulted from Warren's recognition that, like 
Baker v. Carr, 33 this was a task calling for imagination, flexibility, and 
statesmanship. Brennan's search for an appropriate solution that 
would kill the dragons unleashed by the Alabama libel tactic, without 
offending the deep commitment to federalism shared by several of the 
court's members and without yielding to constitutional extremism, 
took him through eight different approaches. 
It was of crucial importance to Brennan that he succeed in struc-
turing an opinion that would command a majority of the Court. Bren-
nan worked to carve out a compromise of values that allowed the press 
latitude for the honest errors that inevitably accompany free debate, 
but denied protection to deliberate falsity. Thus, in the earliest drafts, 
he formulated the so-called "malice" element, requiring proof that the 
falsity was knowing or reckless. Warren and White came aboard 
early, but the difficulty of Brennan's task increased when Black, Doug-
las, and Goldberg declared that they would subscribe only to an abso-
lute immunity for criticism of public officials. Brennan could not 
accept the view that the Constitution shielded deliberate defamatory 
lies about public officials. To win a majority Brennan needed to per-
suade four of the five remaining Justices. He considered it crucial to 
win over Harlan because Harlan's legendary stature and moderation 
were likely to bring others aboard with him and give comfort in con-
servative circles (p. 171). 
A major obstacle was how to deal with the possibility of a retrial in 
the Alabama courts. The easiest formulations of an opinion reversing 
the judgment below would allow the case to be retried, with specified 
obligatory mutterings to the jury about the need for proof of actual 
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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malice, followed by exactly the same result, or worse. This would ac-
complish little. Brennan seems to have perceived instinctively that re-
trial was unthinkable, before he fully understood the framing of 
constitutional reasons for that result. His early drafts ended with "Re-
versed," implicitly foreclosing any.hypothetical/urther proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. This result, however, made Harlan's 
support unlikely, for Harlan's devotion to federalism would probably 
make him unreceptive to the Supreme Court trumping the State's ad-
judicatory power. Yet the first surprise was a memo from Harlan re-
questing the inclusion of a discussion expressly foreclosing retrial 
because plaintiff Sullivan had failed to proffer evidence capable of sat-
isfying the constitutional standard of actual malice. 34 
Black privately warned Brennan that he did not believe Harlan 
would adhere to this view. Black believed the theory was incompati-
ble with Harlan's devotion to federalism and states's rights, and Black 
was right, at least for a while. Once Harlan had inspected a draft 
opinion that included his own suggestion as to why new trial should be 
barred, he withdrew his agreement with this position (pp. 175-76). 
Brennan tried new formulations, suggesting, for example, that the 
high courts were obliged to inspect trial records to be sure that the 
evidence of deliberate falsehood was sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's 
burden to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. Harlan was not 
persuaded. Worse still, Clark appeared convinced by Harlan, and 
White's adherence to Brennan's formulation began to waiver. 
Douglas and Goldberg suddenly proposed a solution. They might 
agree to join in Brennan's opinion while noting their preference for the 
more extreme press protections they advocated. But the offer was 
shortlived. Black, as shepherd of the :flock of free-speech absolutists, 
corralled them back into the fold. Brennan did not have five votes; it 
looked like there would be no majority opinion and, notwithstanding 
reversal of the Sullivan judgment, no solution to the ghastly threat 
posed by libel actions (pp. 179-80). 
The resolution was startling and bizarre. Suddenly Justice Clark, 
who had planned to write separately, advised that he would join in the 
opinion without reservation if Brennan would state in the controver-
sial Part III that Supreme Court review of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence was required by principles of "effective judicial administration." 
Why Clark found talismanic power in those words will always remain 
a mystery, but taken together with Stewart, who also had agreed to 
join, it meant five votes - and an opinion whose theory carried the 
authority of the Supreme Court (p. 180). 
34. Pp. 172-73. Although this requirement was newly imposed since the trial seeking a sim-
ple libel judgment, it applied under Alabama law to an award of punitive damages. As Sullivan 
had sought punitive damages, it could be assumed he had advanced all the evidence he could in 
support of that theory, and he failed to satisfy the test. 
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As the opinion went to press, another gift dropped from heaven. 
Harlan telephoned Brennan at home on Sunday evening. He had de-
cided to withdraw his separate memorandum and to concur in Bren-
nan's opinion without exception. Harlan's concurrence would 
guarantee acceptance in conservative circles. The decision of the 
Supreme Court was announced at 10:00 a.m. the next morning (pp. 
181-82). 
* * * 
I became apprehensive as I approached the final "book" of this 
epic. The title of a concluding chapter proclaims, "The Dancing Has 
Stopped." I groaned. Was this wonderful history about to be marred 
in its last chapters by the tiresome, obligatory refrain of the press on 
the occasion of every court ruling that is not exactly to its liking? The 
First Amendment, it seems, lies battered, tattered, and bloody in the 
street; freedom of speech is dead; fascism is reborn. 
No such thing! Lewis's concluding chapters are balanced and in-
teresting. Lewis himself deplores the press's habitual Greek chorus: 
"When the Supreme Court decides a case against a claimed press in-
terest, editors and publishers too often act as if the Constitution were 
gone" (p. 209). The Court's Herbert v. Lando decision,35 requiring 
press disclosure of its editing process - an inescapable, logical conse-
quence of the plaintiff's new obligation to prove press dishonesty -
was absurdly denounced in editorials as "Orwellian" and "inhibiting 
to the press to a degree seldom seen outside a ... Fascist country" (p. 
209). 
Far from joining the chorus, Lewis notes its absurdity. If the press 
often comes out badly in jury verdicts, Lewis observes, it has itself to 
blame to some degree. A part of its fault lies in its arrogance. As 
analyzed by Rodney Smolla, "The establishment press takes itself so 
seriously." It purports "to dispense not merely news but Truth."36 
The problem is aggravated by the press's "stiff-necked" refusal to ad-
mit mistakes, as well as by its further claims of entitlement to exalted 
status under the Constitution. While the First Amendment gives the 
press broad license to pry into the business of others, it is argued to 
have the opposite meaning when anyone seeks information from the 
press. According to the widespread credo of the press, it is better that 
an innocent defendant should be falsely convicted and sent to jail for 
want of exculpatory evidence than that a reporter should be compelled 
to reveal anything she has learned. Lewis expresses doubt that this 
rule is to be found in the First Amendment. Oddly, however, Lewis 
concludes that when torn between her promise of confidentiality and 
the court's order requiring the reporter to name the source, what the 
reporter should do is go to jail without complaining, thankful that this 
35. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
36. P. 207 (citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 9-19 (1986)). 
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happens only rarely. "That is [the] painful price for the journalist to 
pay ... " (p. 210). Under this solution, the wrongfully convicted crim-
inal defendant will join the journalist in jail. If, as Lewis suggests, this 
is a time when other values trump the press's entitlements, shouldn't 
the reporter comply with the subpoena? Lewis's proposal, sending her 
to jail (while cajoling her not to complain), seems the second worst 
possible solution. 
The chapter heading alluding to the end of the dancing turns out 
not necessarily to be Lewis's evaluation, but a quotation of someone 
else. The bulls and the bears, it seems, agree that dancing may not be 
warranted. What these concluding chapters suggest is either that 
Meiklejohn was a trifle overoptimistic in proclaiming a festival of terp-
sichore, or, more likely, that he meant only a few days and nights of 
dancing, not an eternity. Notwithstanding Sullivan, the future will not 
be rosy for anyone. The issue is difficult and complicated. Were it not 
so, Justice Brennan would deserve a less generous share of our 
admiration. 
False libel can inflict pain, humiliation, and ruin. There are pub-
lishers, editors, and reporters, in print and on the airwaves, who care 
more for sensation than for truth. A story that does not make some-
one look bad is not much of a story. Lewis is confident that the de-
famatory inclination of the press is no more pronounced today than it 
was at the birth of the nation. The scurrilous habits of the early nine-
teenth-century press produced in Jefferson a dramatic change of atti-
tude. Early in his career he said, "Were it left for me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or news-
papers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer 
the latter. "37 After he had been President for six years, he wrote, 
"Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth 
itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle."38 
While Sullivan left the press more free to shed light and expose evil, it 
also left it more free to defame, even to lie. The deliberateness of a lie 
is difficult to prove, especially by the heightened standard of "clear 
and convincing evidence." 
On the other hand, notwithstanding Sullivan's protection, the 
press does take some horrible, unwarranted beatings in the courts, 
which do indeed threaten its ability to function. Juries sometimes 
award outrageous damages - especially in favor of a hometown fa-
vorite against an evil-empire corporation (from New York, if at all 
possible). Furthermore, the expense of defending such suits, particu-
larly when huge damages are sought, can be ruinous. Judges have spe-
cial responsibilities, Lewis argues, to reduce excessive verdicts and to 
grant summary judgments in appropriate cases (p. 214). I agree 
37. P. 206 (citing SAUL PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 92 (1954)). 
38. P. 207 (citing PADOVER, supra note 37, at 97). 
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wholeheartedly with both positions. Judges should not permit the jury 
trial to become our substitute for the guillotine in gratifying the blood 
lust of the populace. 
To illustrate his demand for more liberal grants of summary judg-
ment that would spare the press the ruinous expense of trial, Lewis 
takes this judge to task for having failed to grant summary judgment 
dismissing General W estmoreland's libel suit against CBS. It is not 
my intention to rail indignantly against his contention. This was, as 
my opinion acknowledges, 39 a close, difficult question. Indeed, one of 
the judges I most admire, James L. Oakes, formerly Chief Judge of the 
Second Circuit, told me that in his view I should have granted sum-
mary judgment. 
However, Lewis's discussion makes such a judgment far easier to 
reach than in fact it was. This is so for several reasons. Westmore-
land's suit arose from a CBS documentary asserting that the General, 
as Commander of the United States forces in Vietnam, had falsely re-
ported to the President on the strength of the opposing force. Accord-
ing to Lewis, 
The case turned in part on whether certain [Vietcong] local guerilla 
forces should be included in the estimated numbers of soldiers that the 
United States and South Vietnamese forces were facing. But that ques-
tion in tum depended on a judgment of what kind of war it was. There 
could be no provable "truth" about such matters . . . . Judge Leval ... 
would have done better to recall Justice Harlan's warning in the case of 
Time Inc. v. Hill: "In many areas which are at the center of public de-
bate, "truth" is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to pre-
existing prejudices of a jury the determination of what is "true" may 
effectively constitute a system of censorship." [p. 217] 
First, Lewis has slightly, but significantly, mischaracterized the is-
sue in the lawsuit. Had it really been a question whether General 
Westmoreland was right or wrong in his failure to include those mili-
tia elements in his estimates of enemy strength, I might have granted 
summary judgment. But the issue was different. The documentary 
did not accuse General Westmoreland of simply faulty or incompetent 
intelligence analysis. It accused him of dishonesty. The charge was 
that he deliberately distorted his reported estimates of enemy strength, 
intending to deceive the President by painting a dishonestly optimistic 
picture of a winnable war to support his demand for additional troops. 
Thus, regardless whether Lewis is correct that there could be no 
"truth" or "falsity" as to the validity of Westmoreland's estimates of 
enemy strength, the question whether the General's estimates were 
honestly or dishonestly arrived at is the kind of question on which 
courts rule daily. 
A second reason why it would have been inappropriate to grant 
39. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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summary judgment on the ground Lewis suggests is that CBS never 
argued it. Its motion papers, which ran over a thousand pages, argued 
many points, but not this one. Indeed, its principal argument was pre-
cisely to the opposite effect - that summary judgment should be 
granted because what CBS stated in its documentary was true. 40 
A third (and less significant) weakness in Lewis's argument is that 
the standards for grant of summary judgment have changed drasti-
cally since my Westmoreland decision in 1984. In 1986, the Supreme 
Court announced its summary judgment trilogy, including Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 41 which related directly to libel cases, and the Sullivan 
rule. These decisions liberalize the standard for grant of summary 
judgment, especially in the Second Circuit where the preexisting law 
had been distinctly inhospitable. Had Anderson already been the law, 
I might have granted summary judgment, but not for the reason Lewis 
suggests. The reason would have related directly to the Sullivan rule. 
Sullivan required Westmoreland not only to show that CBS was 
wrong, but also to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was 
dishonest in accusing him. Westmoreland had little evidence to show 
that CBS was insincere in its position. That was CBS's strongest point 
in the summary judgment motion.42 
40. My opinion rejecting it read as follows: 
The principal bulk of defendants's voluminous briefs is dedicated to the point that summary 
judgment should be granted because what was stated in the documentary was true. To this 
contention, it is sufficient answer that plaintiff proffers evidence to the contrary. I express 
no views on the persuasiveness of the proofs offered by either side. Summary judgment must 
be denied if there is conflicting evidence on any substantial issue. 
596 F. Supp. at 1172 (emphasis added). 
Lewis was perhaps misled by the discussion of another CBS contention. CBS contended that 
its charges were absolutely privileged as expressions of "opinion." This argument, however, did 
not relate to opinion about the size of enemy strength, but to its opinion about Westmoreland's 
dishonesty. The rule that shields matters of "opinion" from a libel does not include assertions of 
criminal or dishonest conduct. My decision rejecting this contention stated: 
The heart of [the] case centers on the accusations that General Westmoreland ordered, or 
prevailed upon, his officers to draw dishonest conclusions and give false reports evaluating 
intelligence data. An accusation of such misconduct is clearly outside the protection of the 
"opinion" rule. 
41. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
42. Lewis concludes the chapter by reporting that, when General Westmoreland dropped the 
suit on the eve of its submission to the jury, I said to the jury in consolation that, "[j]udgments of 
history are too subtle and too complex to be resolved satisfactorily with the simplicity of a jury's 
verdict" and that it may therefore be "for the best that the verdict will be left to history." Lewis 
agrees and adds that, if this was so, "the case should never have gone to trial. Judge Leval 
should have granted summary judgment for CBS." P. 218. I assume Lewis's argument is more 
rhetorical, or whimsical, than serious. I doubt he believes judges should dismiss cases whenever 
they think the questions would be better answered by historians. 
If this is a contention that requires answer, I believe the answers are easy. Court proceedings 
give the plaintiff assurance that a presumptively neutral factfinder will focus on his case and 
decide it. No matter how historically interesting the question is, the victim of libel has no assur-
ance that neutral historians will take an interest in his dispute, study it, and render their opin-
ions. Even if they do, historians have no power to award redress. A plaintiff who has lost his 
job, or suffered financial ruin, due to a malicious libel, seeks compensation for his loss, as impor-
tantly as comforting vindication. It would be an odd rule oflaw that deprived him of his lawful 
1154 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1138 
* * * 
I noted at the start that the importance of the Sullivan decision 
was easily underestimated and that it had saved the nation from two 
significant dangers. The first was the danger of either the destruction 
of the press or, more probably, its effective censorship. The press 
could not have paid the damages that southern courts and juries were 
prepared to impose; the eventual and inevitable choice would have 
been to stop reporting on the violent resistance to desegregation. 
The second danger was a consequence of the first. Had the press 
stopped reporting the violent resistance, would the civil rights move-
ment have succeeded? The question is appalling, but real. Had the 
press not served as a daily reminder of what was morally unaccept-
able, would the nation have found it easier to close its eyes and reenter 
its hundred years of sleep? Would the civil rights movement have gen-
erated the solidarity, courage, and determination necessary to succeed, 
not to mention the funding, without the press's daily revelations? At 
the very least, we can safely surmise such huge changes would have 
come far more slowly. When a movement for change derives its impe-
tus from the grass roots, widespread communication of the sources of 
discontent is necessary fuel. 
And so, if Justice Brennan had not persevered through eight differ-
ently conceived drafts, tirelessly pursuing a majority for his theory 
with ingenuity, patience, and diplomacy; if Justice Clark had not 
found solace in the concept of "effective judicial administration/' we 
might today have a very different United States - indeed, a very dif-
ferent world. 
To say that the Sullivan decision was important and rescued us 
from significant dangers, however, is not to say that it solved all the 
problems. Indeed, the Sullivan decision created some problems that 
had not existed before. 
While the press won a limited immunity to awards of damages, 
this was at considerable cost, especially to the journalists, columnists, 
and commentators whose reputations came into play. Sullivan forced 
them into the position of having to take some of their own medicine. 
Previously, it was only the plaintiff whose reputation was at stake. 
The issue was whether the derogatory reports about the plaintiff were 
true or false. Sullivan brought in a new issue: whether the journalist 
remedies merely because the issues raised by his suit might be interesting to historians. (Lewis's 
suggestion sounds rather like the extreme position that the Times advocated and Justice Brennan 
rejected in Sullivan.) 
I do not contend that courts will necessarily reach correct judgments, or even better judg· 
ments than historians. But if historians are indeed interested in pursuing the issue, the court 
judgment in no way impedes them. In fact, to the contrary, the court proceeding may inciden· 
tally help them. Because of the subpoena power available to parties to a lawsuit, the Westmore· 
land case file revealed fascinating testimony of government officials from the Vietnam era who 
would otherwise have remained silent. The lawsuit thus gave rise to the rare phenomenon of 
historical exploration assisted by compulsory process. 
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had deliberately lied. And how can a plaintiff prove that the press 
intentionally misrepresented the facts if he cannot discover what infor-
mation was in the defendant's possession? For the first time, libel 
plaintiffs were given discovery of the investigative and editing process. 
So journalists, who used to stay on the giving end of character assassi-
nation, now are required, by the decision that protected them, to share 
the receiving end as well. And they hate it. Furthermore, by opening 
the entire investigative, writing, and editing process to discovery and 
litigation, Sullivan has rendered the litigation process enormously 
more costly for both sides. 
Although Sullivan protects the press from any award of damages 
in the vast majority of cases, it does nothing to limit the amount of 
damages in other cases. If a half million dollars seemed like a good 
round number to an angry southern jury in the early 1960s, today's 
juries gravitate toward vastly higher numbers. Still, one might ask, if 
damages will be awarded only when the press has deliberately lied, 
what is the harm? Perhaps it is best for press entities that deliberately 
lie to be put out of business. There are several answers. If one re-
porter lied without the knowledge of the editor, does that justify clos-
ing down the press entity that employed her? Does it make sense that 
the plaintiff (and his lawyer) should receive punitive damages (or 
open-ended damages for pain and suffering) in the millions? Further-
more, a jury's finding of deliberate falsehood is not necessarily a true 
finding, notwithstanding appellate court review - which is for suffi-
ciency of the evidence, not for accuracy of the finding. It could be that 
the plaintiff fabricated evidence of deliberate falsehood on the defend-
ant's part. (If, for example, a plaintiff fabricates testimony that the 
reporter admitted her reporting was false but said she was determined 
to harm the plaintiff, this would satisfy the sufficiency test even though 
the evidence was transparently false.) 
Finally, in certain familiar cases, Sullivan results in grotesque un-
fairness to the plaintiff. Suppose that a plaintiff's enemy goes to the 
press with outrageous lies about the plaintiff; the defendant-reporter is 
hoodwinked and prints the lies in the good faith belief they are true; 
plaintiff sues in an effort to rehabilitate his reputation. Plaintiff will 
lose for a reason that is irrelevant to plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff could 
care less whether the press-defendant believed or disbelieved the infor-
mation. What matters to plaintiff is that he has been injured by a false 
report. To make plaintiff the loser because the reporter was gullible 
and believed a malicious falsehood can seem a very strange ordering of 
priorities. 
A partial solution to these problems lies within the grasp of the 
litigants in appropriate cases. The solution is the no-money, no-fault 
libel suit. 
It is frequently said by libel plaintiffs that their motive in suing is 
1156 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1138 
not to win money but to restore a falsely injured reputation. If such a 
plaintiff, nonetheless, sues for damages, he will lose, except in the un-
likely event he can satisfy Sullivan by showing that the defendant 
practiced deliberate (or reckless) falsification. If this plaintiff gives up 
the claim for damages, the problems brought on by Sullivan will disap-
pear. For the rule of the Sullivan case, requiring proof of actual mal-
ice, relates only to an award of money damages. The purpose of the 
malice requirement obviously was not to protect falsehood from expo-
sure. It was to protect the press from the intimidating threat of money 
awards. Justice Brennan's opinion makes this very clear. The opening 
sentence puts forth the question as "the extent to which the constitu-
tional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award 
damages in a libel action brought by a public official."43 His formula-
tion of the holding at the end of the opinion states "We hold today 
that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for 
libel. .... "44 And through the body of the opinion, the discussion 
focuses repeatedly on the huge size of the award and the intimidating 
capacity of damage awards to stifle free debate. 
The requirement of proving actual malice is a precondition to an 
award of money damages. It is not a precondition to a declaratory 
judgment finding a press report to be defamatory and false. If a plain· 
tiff renounces his quest for damages, and seeks only a judgment declar· 
ing the falsity of the defamatory statement, great advantages will flow 
to both sides. For the defendants, journal and journalist, their integ-
rity will no longer be under attack. It will be irrelevant whether the 
statements about the plaintiff were made in good faith or with intent to 
deceive. The defendants will also, as a consequence, be free of the 
obligation to disclose the investigative and editing processes, as this 
discovery relates solely to an issue no longer in dispute. The discovery 
and the trial process will become markedly cheaper, because a major 
issue will have been eliminated. And, finally, the defendants will have 
achieved with certainty the major benefit that even Sullivan could not 
promise: they will not be held liable for money damages. They can 
conduct the litigation free of financial risk. 
As to the advantages for the plaintiff, he increases enormously his 
likelihood of coming out the winner and vindicating his reputation. 
Furthermore, the litigation will be cheaper, both at discovery and 
trial. In most cases the plaintiff gives up nothing to secure these ad· 
vantages. If he is doomed to lose his damage claim because he cannot 
43. 376 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added). In Justice Brennan's first draft, reprinted in an appen· 
dix of Lewis's book, he postulated a much broader question: "The extent that the protections for 
speech and press ... delimit a State's power to apply its law of civil libel . .•• " App. 1, p. 1 
(emphasis added). The narrowing of the question to the power to award damages was unques· 
tionably deliberate, for the problem was money. 
44. 376 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added). 
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prove the defendant was acting in bad faith, the surrender of the claim 
for money damages is virtually without cost. 
Because such an approach seems to offer so many benefits to both 
sides, I would expect to see it tried in time. It is interesting to contem-
plate what the consequence would have been for the trial of Sharon v. 
Time, Inc. 45 if General Sharon had adopted this approach. Sharon 
sued Time by reason of its report that shortly before a Christian 
Phalangist massacre of Palestinians in a Lebanese camp, Sharon had 
discussed with the Phalangist leaders their need to take revenge 
against the Palestinians. In that case, the issue of truth or falsity of 
Time's accusations against Sharon came down to a very simple issue: 
whether Sharon had had a brief conversation with a Phalangist leader. 
In contrast, the Sullivan issues relating to Time's newsgathering and 
editing procedures were enormously complex. It is a fair assumption 
that both sides would have saved millions if the Sullivan issues had 
disappeared and the whole trial and discovery had been concerned 
with the single question whether Sharon had made the statement at-
tributed to him. Furthermore, had the issues been so limited, both 
sides would have realized significant public relations benefits. 
In that case, Judge Abraham Sofaer unbundled the verdict, requir-
ing the jury to deliver special verdicts on each separate element. On 
the issue of truth or falsity, the jury found for General Sharon. On the 
issue of actual malice, it found for Time, making Time the winner of 
the lawsuit. Nonetheless, it was on this issue that Time took the worst 
beating; critics in the press found serious fault with the way Time had 
gone about the fact gathering and checking of the story. 46 
Had the case been tried on a no-money, no-fault basis, Sharon 
would have emerged the winner; the jury's finding in his favor on the 
truth or falsity issue would have become the verdict and judgment. 
Time, although the loser as to the accuracy of its story, would, of 
course, have lost no money. In addition, it would have escaped the 
major embarrassments it suffered at the world's critical appraisal of its 
processes. It seems fair to say, both sides would have been better off in 
the public eye, as well as saving vast sums in litigation costs.47 
45. See 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.), motion denied, 609 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
46. See RENATA ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986). 
47. For a more complete discussion of such standards for libel litigation, see my article, 
Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988). See also David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A 
Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847 (1986); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment 
Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986). These and other pertinent discus-
sions are collected in REFORMING LIBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992). 
